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THE ADVOCATE'S ROLE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
LEE E. TEITELBAUM*

INTRODUCTION
Some 70 years ago, Louis Brandeis observed that "[t] he ethical
question which laymen most frequently ask about the legal profession is this: How can a lawyer take a case which he does not believe
in?"' The answer he gave is in a familiar vein:
As a practical matter, I think the lawyer is not often harassed by this
problem, partly because he is apt to believe at the time in most of
the cases that he actually tries, and partly because he either aban-

dons or settles a large number of those he does not believe in. In any
event, the lawyer recognizes that in trying a case his prime duty is to
present his side to the tribunal fairly and as well as he can, relying2
upon his adversary to present his case fairly and as well as he can.

To most people, one would think, Brandeis' answer attests to the
difficulties of the lawyer's professional role far more than it disproves their significance. There will be, he observes, times when an
attorney must engage in self-deception concerning the merits of
important matters in order to represent his client. Alternately, the
lawyer may relieve his discomfort through withdrawal from the case
or settlement, presumably at a low figure. Finally, should trial eventually be required, counsel can-contrary to every moral lesson
people learn on the way to adulthood and citizenship-transfer to
others at least partial responsibility for the justice of the result.
These are desperate mechanisms for accommodating conflict, and
it is hard to believe that a professional person with such choices can
escape being "harassed." A satisfactory answer to this seemingly
timeless question cannot focus, as Brandeis does, on how it is that an
attorney can handle a case he does not believe in and keep his sanity.
That approach does not explain why lawyers-a large and generally
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. B.A., Harvard College,
1963; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1966; LL.M., Northwestern University School of Law,
1968. The author wishes to express appreciation to his colleagues, Professors Henry Weihofen, Joseph Goldberg, Robert Desiderio, and Fred Ragsdale for their helpful comments
on this manuscript. The author alone is responsible for any infelicity or error.
1. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 Am. L. Rev. 555, 561 (1905).
2. Id.
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sophisticated group, after all-can satisfy themselves with these techniques nor, more important, why they should be encouraged in doing
so. Rather, attention should be directed to the nature of the dilemma
implicit in the layman's question and to the reasons why it has
become proper and even necessary for a lawyer, acting in a professional capacity, to represent clients with whose causes he does not
sympathize.
THE LAWYER AND THE COMMUNITY: ROLES

To understand why laymen find it so hard to understand how
lawyers function, it may be useful to borrow some notions from role
theory. Everybody belongs to groups. Each of us is a member of the
community in which he lives, and may also be a doctor, a parent, a
church member and an Elk. Persons who occupy these social positions are subject to shared expectations about their conduct, against
which expectations the appropriateness of attitudes and specific
behavior are judged.3 These shared expectations are both anticipatory and obligatory in nature. They are anticipatory in that people
rely on them to shape their own conduct and to anticipate how
others will shape theirs. They are obligatory or normative as well
because failure to meet these expectations is considered not only surprising but wrong. A host not only expects a guest to eat with a knife
and fork but thinks it disgusting of him to eat with his hands.
The "role" of one occupying a social position may be defined,
then, as a set of normative prescriptions for behavior.4 These rules,
of course, vary in importance,' clarity and degree of consensus;6
3. P. Secord & C. Backman, Social Psychology 453 (1964).
4. Thomas & Biddle, Basic Concepts for Classifying the Phenomena of Role, in Role
Theory 23, 29 (B. Biddle & E. Thomas eds. 1966) [hereafter cited as Biddle & Thomas] ;
Blake & Davis, Norms, Values and Sanctions, in Handbook of Modern Sociology 456 (R.
Faris ed. 1964). That is not to say that the term "role," which is important in psychological,
sociological and anthropological analysis, has any one agreed meaning. See Biddle & Thomas
at 26. This definition is chosen because it seems "safe" in the sense of having more or less
general acceptance. Id. at 29.
5. Some rules for social living, to take a large group comprising all members of the
community, are enforced by criminal penalties, others by civil but not criminal sanction,
and most by informal or customary (but not legal) sanctions. These distinctions in sanctions
are correlated, if imperfectly, with the differential importance of the rules in society. Davis,
Social Norms, in Biddle & Thomas, supra note 4, at 105. Sociologists and anthropologists
have often used the distinction between "folkways" and "mores" in this connection. The
former have been described as "relatively durable, standardized practices regarded as obligatory in the proper situation but not absolutely obligatory, enforced by informal social
controls (gossip, ridicule, ostracism) rather than by formal complaint or coercion, and
originating "in an unplanned and obscure manner .. " Mores, by contrast, are believed to
be essential for social welfare and are typically subject to severe sanction; they usually
represent moral right in the society. Id. at 105-106.
6. The existence, interpretation or salience of a norm may be the subject of greater or
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nevertheless, they govern conduct with greater or lesser flexibility.
Norms do not, however, exist in isolation. It is of little value to speak
of social norms without regard to sanctions associated with their
violation.' These sanctions may differ in kind and quality; some are
formal and severe (such as punishment for crime) while others are
informal and relatively less severe (gossip, ridicule, ostracism). However, a rule without a sanction cannot usually be considered a group
norm.
Moreover, norms cannot be viewed as ends in themselves. They are
instrumental rules, related to social values or goals. To take a familiar
example, the rule that government officials should be elected has no
independent justification; it is explained by the "value" of democracy. Put another way, the value (democracy) implies choice of elective rather than, say, hereditary office. This relationship of norms to
social values is essential. Values without norms through which they
can be achieved have been called "sociologically irrelevant." ' By the
same token, norms unrelated to social values-whether originally or
by change of circumstances-are by definition arbitrary and capricious.9 Rules exist to carry out values; to the extent that the values
are socially important, creation of some rules (although not necessarily any given set) is necessary to their preservation.'

0

lesser agreement among the members of a group. P. Secord & C. Backman, supra note 3, at
470. Unanimity with respect to all elements of a role set cannot be expected; thus consensus
should be considered a variable rather than an attribute that is or is not present. J. M.
Yinger, Toward a Field Theory of Behavior 106 (1965).
7. See Blake & Davis, supra note 4, at 457. It is, indeed, doubtful whether rules only
permitting but not requiring certain behavior can be called norms. Id.
8. Blake & Davis, supra note 4, at 456-5 7. See also P. Secord & C. Backman, supra note
3, at 463.
9. Hence, the ancient rule of logic "Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex" (When the
reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases). Co. Litt. 70(b). See H. Broom, Legal Maxims
126-28 (7th ed. 1900) for various applications of this rule. Indeed, the principle that a rule
for behavior, to be accepted, must bear some relationship to a governmental value has
substantial constitutional significance, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (Sixth
Amendment forbids invocation of "arbitrary," but well-established, common law rule of
evidence that an accomplice may not be called to testify on behalf of his associate). The
proposition that the governmental value justifying the rule must itself be acceptable is
illustrated in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (validity of miscegenation statute explained in terms of value of white supremacy).
10. Even widespread violation of role requirements does not disprove the existence or
validity of norms. "[W]e can say that a role is the list of what most members of a social
group believe a position occupant should and should not, may and may not, do. It is not a
list of what most occupants of a position in fact do." J. M. Yinger, supra note 6, at 100.
Thus, for example, abstention from theft is properly viewed as a community norm, even
though many or most members of the community may steal at some point.
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THE NORMS OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE
NORMS OF THE PROFESSION:
The layman to whom Brandeis referred was presumably speaking
from the perspective of community norms. Implicitly, the question
is, "How can a lawyer justify doing something that, measured against
the norms of the community, is wrong?" Taking a case one doesn't
believe in appears to contravene well-settled rules requiring that one
associate oneself only with causes in which one believes. A person
who signs a petition for a candidate whom he does not support will
be labeled a "hypocrite" and will be subject at least to the sanction
of social disapproval. Another who denies that X is guilty knowing X
in fact to be as guilty as sin is popularly known as a "liar;" a third
person who allows his name to be used because it doesn't really seem
to matter will be called a "cynic." These terms are clearly opprobrious, and their use can be considered a form of customary sanction.
Community norms, it should be added, are usually sensible and
sometimes very important. For example, the conduct expected of a
citizen in dealing with one known or believed guilty of some terrible
crime is clear enough. It is surely wrong for him to assist a thief or
murderer escape punishment for his offense, and he may also be
under an affirmative obligation to inform the police of what he
knows. These are norms whose derivation and sanction are not
merely informal; irresponsibility in this regard is viewed with such
gravity that, for example, a citizen who knowingly provides means of
flight for a criminal is subject not only to public obloquy but to
criminal penalty. 1 1 For a lawyer, knowing or believing his client is
guilty, to take a case and assist the defendant to escape punishment
(by, for example, successfully moving to suppress vital but legally
inadmissible evidence) seems to the layman clearly inconsistent with
the norms of the community, and to be socially dangerous behavior
as well.
11. At common law, one who aided a known felon was deemed an accessory after the
fact and was punishable by death. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *37-39 (Chitty ed.
1827). Many current statutes retain the old terminology but broaden the definition (to
include, for example, those who aid known misdemeanants) or who have created new
statutory language to describe the crime (e.g., "harboring or aiding a felon," N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40A-22-4 (Repl. Vol. 1972); "obstructing justice," Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 31-4 (Supp.
1975-76). See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 525 (1972).
The common law crime of misprison of felony, consisting of failure to report or
prosecute one known to have committed a felony, has long been thought obsolete except in
cases of treason. Id. at 526. However, a person who agrees not to prosecute in exchange for
consideration of some kind may be guilty of compounding a crime. Id. at 526-27; 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *133-34 (Chitty ed. 1827).
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The community norms just described are, beyond doubt, proper
and rational. In ordinary dealings we rely on people to tell the truth
about what they believe because that is an important guide to behavior and because, without candor, social interaction would be difficult. In the case of the "hypocritical" signature on the petition, the
actor's conduct clearly frustrates the very purpose for employing the
petition procedure. The norm that prohibits aiding a criminal to
escape is closely related to the value of law enforcement in the
community.
Brandeis' layman, having satisfied himself that the community
norms are appropriate, stops at this point. He knows that his expectations are violated by the lawyer's conduct and that he would be
sanctioned in some degree for similar behavior. As Macaulay suggests
in a related context, it is hard for a layman not to wonder "whether
it be right that a man should, with a wig on his head, and a band
round his neck, do for a guinea what, without those appendages, he
would think it wicked and infamous to do for an empire .... -"
Some lawyers also stop at this point. As we have already seen,
each individual ordinarily occupies a number of social positions at
the same time. Thus, a lawyer's role as member of the bar is but one
of several which he assumes. Expectations are held about his behavior in each of these roles, and these expectations sometimes
differ. A lawyer who is also a parent, for example, is subject to one
set of norms that says, "You must work as long as necessary to
prepare for trial," and to another saying, "As a parent, you are
expected to spend time with your family." ' ' He may also face a
conflict between norms of the profession of which he is a member
and the community of which he is also a member, since taking a case
he does not believe in contravenes what he learned long before entrance into the legal profession. The strain resulting from inconsistent role demands may be acutely uncomfortable. Some lawyers, in
order to practice, seek to relieve role stress by psychological devices
such as those mentioned by Brandeis. Others resolve their ambivalence by choosing a field of practice in which the occasions for acting
in a manner that seems inconsistent with ordinary norms are less
common or at least less commonly perceived. This probably accounts
12. T. Macaulay, Lord Bacon, in 2 T. Macaulay, Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous
Essays and Poems 142, 170-71 (1889).
13. See N. Gross, W. Mason, & A. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of
the School Superintendants Role 249 (1958). See also, Burchard, Role Conflicts of Military
Chaplains, 19 Am. Soc. Rev. 528, 532 (1954), for analysis of the conflicting positions
occupied by military chaplains as religious leaders and as military officers.
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to criminal
in substantial part for the low position currently ascribed
1
practice, where the sharpest conflicts tend to arise. 4

For attorneys to stop at this point is, however, both wrong and
dangerous. Lawyers are allowed and often required to act in a way
that would be impermissible for laymen. The fact that they are
allowed or required to do so is significant. Although a layman can be

compelled at trial to disclose a secret, an attorney is not only free
from such compulsion but may not disclose a client's confidence
even if he wants to. The layman must testify because we rely heavily
on community witnesses to resolve judicial disputes; the lawyer may
not because confidentiality in the professional relationship is con-

sidered more important than obtaining a lawyer's testimony. 1" This
judgment reveals a system of values in which there are both profes-

sional and community norms and, in cases of conflict, the community norm is held less important. In fact, the lawyer is prohibited
from choosing the community norm. 1 6 The same observation can be
made of the norm concerning aiding a known criminal. The lawyer is
required by his professional role to take steps which may enable the
defendant to escape punishment, but his behavior is clearly
exempted from the law against obstructing justice.
In short, there are accepted social values which justify behavior of

attorneys that differ from conduct expected of the community members generally. The existence of these values indicates that attorneys
occupy, when acting in their professional capacities, a recognized
14. Ladinsky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practiceand the
Law, 16 J. Legal Ed. 127, 139 (1963) (criminal practice described as "the 'dirty work' of
the bar"); J. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own 18 (1962) (criminal matters described as "the
undesirable cases, the dirty work"). These references are also set forth in V. Countryman &
T. Finman, The Lawyer in Modern Society 12, 14 (1966).
15. The general rule that the public "has a right to every man's evidence" has been firmly
established since at least the early 1600's. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2190 (McNaughton rev.
1961). Its importance in criminal trials is reflected by the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the accused a right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. U.S. Const.,
amend. VI; for a collection of similar state provisions, see 8 J. Wigmore, supra, at § 2191, n.
1 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Thus, any exemption from the obligation to testify is distinctly
exceptional, and must find support in strong policy reasons. See id. § 2285. The reasons for
exempting attorneys from a testimonial duty with respect to confidential communications
are discussed below.
16. Many of the special expectations associated with the lawyer's role operate only when
he is engaged as a lawyer. If, for example, a person licensed to practice law saw X, a
stranger, shoot Y, and was asked by X to help him escape punishment, the attorney may
only take steps having that effect if he is consulted in his professional capacity. Similarly,
the rules of confidentiality only apply when there has been at least an attempt to create a
lawyer-client relationship. 8 Wigmore, supra note 15, at § 2304. See also United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); In the Matter of Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), holding that when a person who happens to be a lawyer is consulted solely as an
accountant, there is no privilege.
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social position separate from that of laymen (or, for that matter,
lawyers not acting in a professional capacity). 1 ' To understand why
this is so, and thus why lawyers may take cases they don't believe in,
it is important to examine the lawyer's professional role with some
care. In considering the norms that comprise this as any other role,
we must also identify the goals or values they serve. With respect to
the lawyer's role, these goals or values are found in the legal process.
Professional advocates are licensed and recognized only because, it is
believed, such persons contribute to the operation of the legal system; thus the importance of rules of professional conduct-much like
the rules of procedure and evidence-can only be evaluated in relation to the goals of the legal system.
NORMS AND VALUES IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LITIGATION
The Value of Legitimacy
Perhaps the most important goal of any legal system lies in providing a forum for enforcing claims that the substantive law
allows.1 Without such a forum, legal rights, together with the political and social principles they embody, have little significance. Moreover, legal forms of dispute resolution-which are, after all, only one
set of processes for handling conflict-will not be perceived as legitimate by the community. One creates a law on the rights of mortgagees so that, first, members of society will feel free to lend money
to others and, second, so that an unpaid lender will be able peaceably
to recover what he has lost. If mortgagees seeking to foreclose cannot
routinely present their claims for authoritative resolution, however,
the law of mortgages will not-at least in the long run-accomplish
the goals for which it was created. Presumably, over time, some
potential lenders will remove their money from circulation and
others will rely on self-help to recover what they think is theirs. The
same would be true if tenants were routinely denied access to courts
in order to restrain unlawful eviction; the eviction would, from at
least one perspective, become lawful whatever formal law might
say.' 9
The rules adopted by the legal system must, therefore, facilitate
17. The privilege belongs to the client, and only he-not his attorney-may decide
whether to disclose confidential information. C. McCormick, Evidence 192-97 (2d ed.
1972).
18. E.g., F. James, Civil Procedure 2 (1965).
19. In a very practical sense, as Holmes pointed out long ago, law is significant for what
it means to a bad man who is aware of the legal consequence of his action. Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897). To a bad man aware that the courts
would do nothing, there is in this sense no law against his conduct.
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presentation and resolution of claims arising under the law. That
value generally shapes the rules of civil and criminal procedure; it is
also central to the rules governing conduct of counsel. The Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly recognizes this relationship in
explaining why the lawyer's fundamental duty is to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law:
The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the
public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our
government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is
entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with
the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible
means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue or
defense. 2 0
If legal assistance is at all necessary-and there is good reason to
believe that it is2 1-routine refusal by lawyers to represent mortgagees who wish to foreclose would effectively limit if not destroy
that, remedy, in the same way that impeding access to courts in any
other way would achieve that result. In the criminal area, if attorneys
must, or even if they may, refuse to participate in a denial on behalf
of a client known to be guilty, the latter has lost, for all practical
purposes, the right to put the state to its burden of proof before
conviction and sentence. This point is, it should be said, nothing
novel; it was the view of Lord Brougham in his celebrated defense of
Queen Caroline2 2 and of Erskine in his defense of Thomas Paine:
From the moment that any advocate can be permitted to say that he
will or will not stand between the Crown and the subject arraigned
in the court where he daily sits to practice, from that moment the
liberties of England are at an end. If the advocate refuses to defend
from what he may think of the charge or of the defense, he assumes
the character of the judge; nay, he assumes it before the hour of
judgment; and in proportion to his rank and influence, puts the
20. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-1.
21. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932):
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
22. 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821).
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heavy influence of perhaps a mistaken opinion into the scale against
the accused, in whose favor the benevolent principle of English law
makes all presumptions. .. 3

Once it is appreciated that the legal profession exists largely to
enable laymen to present their claims under law for adjudication, it is
not surprising to find a variety of general and specific rules for behavior binding counsel to his client's desires. Perhaps most directly,
Disciplinary Rule 7-101 provides that "A lawyer shall not intentionally . . . [f] ail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through
reasonably available means.... -2 It is important to note that this

rule-violation of which invites both professional censure and civil
liability-expressly conveys to the client the choice of lawful objective. The lawyer, it is true, should fully inform his client of all legal
and nonlegal considerations that bear on general posture and strategy
in the case. 2 s If pursuit of an available remedy would work great
hardship, counsel may point that out to his client and even urge that
the remedy be abandoned or a compromise accepted. However, it is
clear that "(I)n the final analysis ... to forego legally available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the
client and not for himself."2 6 Even with respect to those profes23. Rex v. Paine, [17921 22 How. St. Tr. 358, 412. The position taken by Erskine isa
version of the so-called "taxi-cab" rule of the English bar. A barrister does not have the
option to accept or refuse clients as he likes; rather, he must undertake representation of all
clients who, through a solicitor, approach him, assuming their problems are within his
competence and they can pay his fee. See D. Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer
164-65 (1973). This rule is of ancient lineage; a similar injunction was promulgated by the
Scots Court of Session on May 27, 1532, stating: "No advocate without very good cause
shall refuse to act for any person tendering a reasonable fee under pain of deprivation of his
office of advocate." Quoted in MacMillan, Law and Other Things 179 (1937).
The current "American rule" does not require every lawyer to accept every case where
the client can pay his fee. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-26. It does,
however, provide systematic assurance that every defendant will be provided legal representation if he is entitled to it by constitutional or other rule. Should an accused (or in some
cases a civil party) be unable to obtain counsel, whether for financial or other reasons, an
attorney will be appointed by the bench or bar association. A lawyer approached to represent a client under these circumstances is less free to refuse the case, and may seek to be
excused only for "compelling reasons." Such reasons do not include, the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly states, "the repugnance of the subject matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person involved in the case, the belief of the lawyer that
the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty, or the belief of the lawyer regarding the
merits of the civil case." ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-29. Once representation is undertaken, of course, the manner in which it began is immaterial and whether
to plead guilty is a matter for the client to decide. Thus, although methods differ markedly,
both English and American rules operate to make certain that criminal defendants are able
to secure legal assistance in their efforts to put the state to its proof.
24. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-101(A).
25. Id EC 7-8.
26. Id. EC 7-7, 7-8. For example, it is for the client ultimately to decide what plea to
enter, ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function § 5.2(a); Machibroda v. United
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sional judgments that are largely committed to the attorney's discretion, he must take care to act in a manner consistent with the client's
chosen interests.2
The rules of professional conduct facilitate presentation of claims,
therefore, by prohibiting counsel from insisting that his own view of
the social merits of the claim be followed. A correlative set of rules
enforces the lawyer's association with his client's interests by restricting the former's exposure to covertly compromising influences that
might affect his willingness zealously to pursue a client's objectives.2 8 An attorney may not undertake representation when his
personal interests may conflict with those of a client, 2 9 nor may he
without informed consent represent multiple clients whose interests
are adverse.' 0 He is further enjoined not to accept compensation
from a source other than his client unless the latter understands and
agrees to that arrangement, 3 and may not in any event permit the
source of payment to affect the way in which he carries out his
client's interests. 3 2 Any pressure that distracts an attorney from
seeking his client's interests interferes with an obligation which, "in
its fullest sense, is the heart of the adversary process." 3 3
Other norms more obliquely advance the goal of facilitating presentation of claims. Communications by a client to his attorney are
protected from disclosure to allow individuals freely to seek legal
advice and determine whether there exists an available legal right or
benefit. 3 So that clients may confidently inform their attorneys of
all potentially relevant matters and thereby obtain full consideration
of potential rights, a rule of evidence allows the client to insist,
except in narrowly defined circumstances, that his communications
be held secret.3 ' There are, as well, complementary rules of professional conduct that generally enjoin an attorney from revealing his
client's confidences without consent. 6
States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962), or whether a civil settlement should be offered or
accepted. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-7; ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Opinion C-455 (1961).
27. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-9.
28. See id. EC 5-1.
29. Id. EC 5-2; DR 5-101(A).
30. Id. EC 5-14 to 20; DR 5-105.
31. Id. EC 5-21, 5-22; DR 5-107(A).
32. Id. EC 5-23; DR 5-107(B).
33. Thode, The EthicalStandardfor theAdvocate, 39 Texas L. Rev. 575, 584 (1961).
34. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). See also D. Mellinkoff,
supra note 23, at 137-40.
35. D. Mellinkoff, supra note 23, at 137-40.
36. ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4 passim. The rules of confidentiality under the Code are broader than the legally-enforced attorney-client privilege. Except
where specifically allowed, lawyers are enjoined to preserve both "confidences," which are
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Many of these rules are further addressed to the second aspect of
the goal of legitimacy-the perception by clients and the community
at large that the legal system provides a fair and convenient process
for determination of claims. Identification of counsel with his
client's interests serves to reassure the latter that his case will fully be
presented for the court's consideration, without regard either to his
popularity or the popularity of the action he seeks. The rules of
confidentiality are also largely intended to promote trust in the legal
system by assuring the client that his attorney will not become a

witness against him. Proscriptions against conflicts of interest similarly bear a close relation to the perception of legitimacy. As the
Connecticut Supreme Court has observed:
When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of
business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is finally
disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one
upon whom he looks as his advocate and champion. If, as in this
case, he is sued and his home attached by his own attorney, who is
representing him in another matter, all feeling of loyalty is necessarily destroyed, and the profession
is exposed to the charge that it
37
is interested only in money.
The client's confidence may also be undermined when it is apparent

to one client that an attorney representing him must contend on
behalf of another client something that his interests demand be
opposed. Thus, a lawyer is allowed to represent multiple clients with
conflicting interests only when he has put the potential perception of
divided loyalty aside by advising each client of the situation and

obtaining his consent to the arrangement. 3 8 And, even then, the
risks posed to both the reality and the appearance of unfairness may
be so great that multiple representation is improper despite consent

of the parties.'
defined as information protected by the evidentiary privilege, and "secrets," which include
unprivileged information acquired through the professional relationship that the client has
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or detrimental
to the client. Id. DR 4-101(A). A lawyer is allowed to reveal confidences or secrets only
with the consent of the client, when specifically permitted by other disciplinary rules or
required by law or court order, when necessary to prevent his client from committing a
crime, or in order to collect his fee or defend against accusation of wrongful conduct. Id.
DR 4-101(C).
37. Grievance Committee v. Rattner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (1964).
38. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-16, DR 5-105(A).
39. Id. EC 5-15, DR 5-105(C); ABA, Standards Relating to the Defense Function
§ 3.5(b). Joint representation of two or more defendants with conflicting interests in a
criminal case has been held a denial of the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel, without necessity that specific prejudice be shown. Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942). See Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1077,
1108-09 (1973).
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A variety of other rules are also at least partially addressed to this
value. Canon 9 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, to take
one example, is candidly entitled "A lawyer should avoid even the
appearance of Professional Impropriety," in the belief that "Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules
of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained
through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profession." 4
That Canon
requires on pain of disciplinary sanction that counsel refuse private
employment in a matter with which he was substantially involved
while in public office, that he keep strictly separate his personal
funds and any money or property received from a client, and that he
avoid other actions creating the appearance of wrongdoing. 4
The Value of Accuracy
The attorney's identification with his client's interests also promotes another goal of the civil and criminal justice systems: accurate
determination of factual and legal propositions. This value, like that
of openness, finds expression throughout the rules of procedure and
evidence. Rules of presentation and proof are largely designed to
assure that information before the trier of facts has some tendency
to establish a fact of consequence in the trial and that this tendency
is not outweighed by its capacity to distract or improperly prejudice
the jury's determination. The procedural mechanism for promoting
accuracy is the adversary system, which has appropriately been
called the "competitive system in the administration of the law." 4 2
Under this procedure, responsibility for investigation, development
and presentation of propositions of law and fact is placed on the
parties themselves because, it is assumed, they are most strongly
motivated to bring all material evidence and argument to the court's
attention.4 ' The resulting demonstration will, it is further assumed,
best enable judge or jury to determine the truth of the positions
asserted. 4
40. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 9-1.
41. Id. DR 9-101, 9-102.
42. Cheatham, The Lawyer's Role and Surroundings, 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 405, 409
(1960).
43. F. James, Civil Procedure 5 (1965); E. Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the
Anglo-American System of Litigation 1 (1965).
44. Jerome Frank described the self-interest notion underlying the adversarial system in
the following way:
I suggest that the fighting theory of justice is not unrelated to, and not
uninfluenced by, extreme laissez-faire in the economic fieldz
"Classical" laissez-faire economic theory assumed that, when each individual, as an "economic man," strives rationally, in the competitive economic
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The importance of adversarial presentation to accuracy is suggested by the general reluctance of courts to let a case proceed to
judgment when a party advances a claim in which he has no special
interest or does so on behalf of others. Whether a claimant has standing to raise a constitutional issue depends in part on ". . . whether
the party seeking relief has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely
depends.. . ."
The same principle applies in the very different context of divorce law, where the bar of collusion may apply even when
there is no demonstrated fraud by either spouse. "[W] hen the parties
to a suit are acting in complete concert, the Court is deprived of the
security for eliciting the whole truth, afforded by the contest of
opposing interests, and is rendered unable to pronounce a decree of
dissolution of marriage with sufficient confidence in its justice." 4 6
Rules governing class actions similarly depend on "man's natural
instinct to act in his own best interest in order to achieve justice and
procedural efficiency in mass litigation." 4
Where the representative's interest does not comport with that of his constituency, courts,
deprived of confidence that class interests will be wholeheartedly
advanced, will not allow the representatives to conduct the suit on
behalf of others.
The participation of professional counsel is generally thought
struggle or "fight," to promote his own self-interest, we attain public welfare
through the wisest use of resources and the most socially desirable distribution
of economic goods. The "fight" theory of justice is a sort of legal laissez-faire.
It assumes a "litigious man."
J.Frank, Courts on Trial 92 (1950).
It is, of course, true that there has been substantial criticism of the "fight" theory of
litigation precisely on the ground that it does not lead to accurate fact determination. Frank
himself analogized the adversarial lawyer's tactics as "[T] he equivalent of throwing pepper
in the eyes of a surgeon when he is performing an operation." Id at 85. More recently,
Judge Marvin Frankel has added his powerful voice to the criticism of traditional adversarial
procedure. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1031
(1975). For our purposes, it is enough that, rightly or wrongly, an adversarial method of
proof has been accepted in the belief that it will advance the goal of accuracy. Of course, if
some other mode of presentation were chosen, the specific rules of professional behavior
could be expected to change in accordance with the new mode's requirements. In Bulgaria
and Cuba, for example, the adversarial system is not employed and, in both, counsel's
function lies in seeking objective truth rather than in putting the state to its proof. J.
Kaplan, Criminal Justice 264-66 (1972).
45. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
46. Churchward v. Churchward, [1895] P. 7, 64. The dangers of collusive proceedings
are so great a concern that even "non-fault" jurisdictions have continued to apply the
traditional principle. E.g., McKim v. McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673, 493 P.2d 868, 100 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1972).
47. Homburger, State Class Actions and The FederalRules,71 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 610
(1971).
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important to achieving accuracy in civil and criminal proceedings.
Among the consequences of resort to judicial dispute resolution is a
transformation of the underlying conflict; it is no longer "real" in
the sense that only those aspects of the original transaction which
may have legal consequences under substantive law can be proved. 4 8
Among the duties of counsel, therefore, is the removal of considerations and emotions that are not material to the case and can only
confuse or distract the decisional process.4 Specifically, the lawyer
is professionally obliged to keep from the jury any matters that are
legally inadmissible' 0 and to conduct the proceeding with restraint
and fairness, however unpleasant the relations between the parties.' '
Professional advocates are further thought necessary to the full
and accurate presentation and testing of evidence before the court.
Few laymen know enough about the law to understand what kinds
of proof matter in any given case or are capable of demonstrating the
weakness of superficially persuasive testimony. Only if all information properly bearing on the dispute is clearly established and closely
examined can the trier of fact confidently decide where the truth
most probably lies, and this confidence usually is unavailable without
the competent participation of an attorney. Since, however, careless
or incompetent representation would largely frustrate this goal,
lawyers are expected fully to investigate the facts prior to trial so
that they will be able to present their client's story in the best light
and to examine closely the opposing evidence. Preparation is also
required if counsel is to develop legal arguments essential to preserving his client's interests. Failure by council to undertake prompt,
adequate investigation and preparation has sometimes been held to
5
constitute incompetent representation as a constitutional matter 2
48. See Michael & Adler, The Trial of An Issue of Fact: I, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1224, 1228
(1934).
49. G. Simmel, Conflict, in Conflict and The Web of Group Affiliations 37 (K. Wolff.
transl., 1955).
50. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(C).
51. Id. EC 7-10, 7-20.
52. Courts have traditionally been reluctant to reverse convictions on this ground, doing
so only when the lawyer's dereliction was such as to reduce the trial to a "mockery of
justice." E.g., Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S., 916
(1967); Nutt v. United States, 335 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964);
United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909
(1964). Nevertheless, neglect of factual or legal preparation was sometimes held to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. E.g., People v. lbarra, 60 Cal.2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963). There is, as well, some tendency to depart from the "mockery" and
similar tests and particularly to use the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function as
at least partial guides to the determination of adequacy of counsel. E.g., State v. Harper, 57
Wis.2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203-04
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
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and clearly provides grounds for professional discipline.' 3
Moreover, since the adversary system relies on frankly partisan
presentation to inform the trier of fact, counsel is bound not only to
present his case and examine the opponent's presentation, but to do
so vigorously. He may not simply set forth a party's position or fail
to use any legitimate form of impeachment or persuasion on his
behalf. To the extent that an advocate fails to pursue his client's
interests fully and effectively, it has been observed, "[T1 he adversary
Indeed, zealous and partisan
process is not being fully utilized."'
advocacy may rise to the level of a constitutional requirement in
criminal matters, as the Supreme Court recognized in holding, with
respect to appellate matters, that a procedure in which counsel acts
"merely as an amicus curiae" does not provide "that full consideration ... of the matter as is obtained when counsel is acting in [an
advocacy] capacity." ' I
The Value of Expedience
In addition to legitimacy and accuracy, civil and criminal justice
systems alike value expedience or administrative convenience. It is
obviously desirable that any system for dealing with a large volume
of demands preserve its resources from needless expenditure. This
goal has considerable significance in civil and criminal areas alike.
Few courts can accommodate the current volume of civil disputes;
congestion and long delays are common in many jurisdictions.5 6 As
might be expected, a variety of devices for diversion or early determination of cases is employed. In the civil system, motions to dismiss
are used to eliminate those cases in which no legitimate claim or
defense is presented, and motions for summary judgment serve to
avoid full trial when only issues of law are involved. Procedures for
pretrial discovery operate to expedite formulation of issues and presentation of the case; ' pretrial conferences are addressed to the
same purposes and, as a practical matter, encourage settlement of
(1968). These Standards strongly emphasize the importance of preparation and investigation. ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function, § § 3, 6, 4, 1.
53. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 6-101(A)(2).
54. Thode, supra note 33, at 588-89.
55. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 730, 743 (1967).
56. For an overview of the problem, see G. Winters, Selected Readings: Court Congestion
and Delay, (1971); Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and ProposedRemedies,
in The Courts, The Public, and The Law Explosion 22 (H. Jones ed. 1965). Although
criminal cases must be expedited to comply with statutory time limits and the constitutional right to a "speedy trial," delay can also present problems in this area. For a recent
analysis, see Levin, Delay in Five Criminal Courts, 4 J. Legal Studies 83 (1975).
57. See generally Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal Practice, 7 Vand. L.
Rev. 576 (1954); Developments in The Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1961).
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cases without trial.' 8 Scarcity of judicial resources also creates grave
concern on the criminal side. The inability of courts to handle all
prosecutions that could come before them has led to a number of
procedures for diversion, among them legitimation of discretionary
police activity, recognition of a wide ambit of prosecutorial discretion, approval of subjudicial diversionary programs for first offenders, and-perhaps most notable-heavy reliance on negotiated
pleas of guilty in lieu of trial.' 9
The value of institutional expedience is reflected in rules for the
conduct of attorneys as well as in procedural devices. Every attorney
is obliged to be punctual in fulfilling his professional commitments,
and deliberate or negligent failure in this regard has frequently been
held grounds for a criminal contempt citation.6 0 Similarly, continuances are to be requested only for justifiable reason, and false or
equivocal statements in seeking delay may result in disciplinary
action or criminal penalty.6 1 The same goal explains, although only
in part, rules against the filing of claims intended only to harass an
opponent 6 2 or the use of ill-founded motions solely to delay the
proceeding. 6 3 Although there is some tendency to view the prohibitions against dilatory tactics as "technical" in nature, these rules are
doubtless important adjuncts to the value of convenience and expedience in resolution of disputes. 6 4
LIMITS ON SEEKING A CLIENT'S OBJECTIVES
If one thing emerges from this discussion, it is that the legal system relies heavily on advocacy by counsel of his client's objectives to
achieve its most important goals. There are also limits to what a
lawyer may do in pursuit of those objectives. In the somewhat un58. See C. Wright, Federal Courts 399-402 (2d ed. 1970).
59. Indeed, the suggestion has been made that, without plea negotiations, the criminal
justice system would be unable effectively to function. Steinberg & Paulsen, A Conversation
with Defense Counsel on Problems of A CriminalDefense, 7 Prac. Lawyer 25, 31 (1961).
60. ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function, § 1.2(a), (b); H. Drinker, Legal
Ethics 82 (1953). On the contempt sanction, see Note, An Attorney Fine: A Sanction to
Ensure Compliance with Court CalendarOrders, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 382, 391-94 (1963); and
cases collected in Annotation, 97 ALR 2d 431 (1964).
61. ABA, Standards Relating to The Defense Function 179-80 (App. Dr. 1971).
62. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(1).
63. ABA Standards supra, at § 1.2 and Commentary Thereto; Albano v. Commonwealth,
315 Mass. 531, 53 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1944).
64. The extent to which defense counsel is responsible for delay in criminal cases has
been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Zeisel, Court Delay Caused by the Bar in G.
Winters supra note 56, at 48; Tauro, Court Delay and the Trial Bar-One Judge's Opinion,
id at 52; Levin, supra note 56, at 104-114. There is no doubt, however, that lack of
diligence and strategic continuances by counsel account for some measure of delay which, if
not controlled, would create even greater administrative problems.
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helpful but traditional phrase, the lawyer owes his client zealous
advocacy "within the bounds of the law." Perhaps the most familiar
of these bounds are rules requiring "candor" in dealing with the
court, prohibiting dilatory tactics, and the like. The rules of civil
procedure, for example, require relatively precise and careful pleading. 6 5 Responsibility for avoiding deception is squarely placed on
attorneys by the Federal Rules, which require counsel to sign every
pleading filed by or on behalf of his client and further provide that
the attorney's signature "constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading [and] that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it." 6 6 Knowing
violation of this rule by counsel is ground for both contempt citation
and professional discipline.6 Similarly, it is unprofessional conduct
for an attorney knowingly to make a false statement of law or fact to
the court, 6 8 or to allow a client or witness to do so.6 9 On the
affirmative side, if counsel discovers after the fact that perjury or
other fraud has been perpetrated on the court or another party, he is
bound to reveal that fact to the court if the wrongdoer refuses to do
so himself."0 With regard to matters of law, it is also the settled,
albeit uncomfortable, rule that a lawyer must disclose legal precedent
in the jurisdiction adverse to his position if his opponent fails to call
it to the court's attention. 7
These rules-like those prohibiting dilatory tactics-often seem inconsistent with the general rule that an attorney should follow his
client's instructions and take all steps to strengthen his client's position. It may, for example, be true that only a lie can produce a
victory for the client; intentional delay can lead to a better settlement offer or even the opponent's complete collapse. Certainly disclosure of directly adverse legal precedent can lead to a ruling against
the client's objectives. And, it should be said, the opinion that these
rules are inconsistent with the lawyer's general duty has been en65. While technical accuracy is not so important as it once was, honesty and substantive
accuracy is. Thus, denial of an allegation is improper not only when a party knows the
allegation to be true but when he has no information or belief that it is false; in the latter
case, he must state the lack of knowledge which will then be treated as a denial. E.g., Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(b); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 3018(a).
66. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
67. C. Wright, Federal Courts 274-75 (2d ed. 1970).
68. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(5).
69. Id DR 7-102(A)(4).
70. Id DR 7-102(B).
71. Id. DR 7-106(B); Thode, supra note 33, at 585. The precedent need not be "controlling"- that is, indistinguishable from and decisive of the instant case; but must be a decision
that is "directly adverse to any proposition of law on which the lawyer expressly relies,
which would reasonably be considered important by the judge sitting on the case." ABA
Ethics and Grievances Committee, Opinions, No. 280 (1949).
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couraged by the view, formerly common, that requirements of candor and the like are duties owed by counsel "to the court," as
7
distinguished from the lawyer's duties "to his client."
This view is, I think, wrongly conceived, because it overlooks the
reasons for generally defining the lawyer's role in terms of advocacy
of his client's interests: Providing a forum for determining of claims
arising under the law and promoting informed and accurate decisions
by judges or juries. By and large, adherence to the client's objectives
will serve those goals, but this is only generally true. Like all rules of
thumb, it should be qualified where its observance will greatly frustrate the reasons for the rule's adoption. False pleading in civil cases,
for example, advances neither the goal of maintaining a forum for
resolution of legal claims nor that of accurately determining questions of fact and law. The former interest cannot exist when a party
has no true facts to set forth in support of a legally recognized claim
or defense, or when no arguable legal theory can be advanced to
justify his position. One who, having been advised that he cannot
expect judicial relief, insists on going forward in these circumstances
is not seeking a legitimate forum but probably seeks rather to harass
or otherwise injure his opponent. It is not a proper goal of the civil
legal system to provide that opportunity. While the client who is told
by his lawyer, "You have no case, and I cannot participate in manufacturing one" may feel aggrieved by the legal system, any resulting
perception of illegitimacy is irrational and, while unfortunate, cannot
be remedied without greater cost. Of course, the goal of accuracy
can, by hypothesis, only be disserved by false pleading. Finally, presentation of such claims involves potentially considerable waste of
time and money for the parties and the court.
Thus, rules requiring accurate pleading promote rather than contravene the underlying justifications for defining counsel's role in
terms of advocacy. The same rationale applies to other limits placed
on the attorney's responsibility to pursue his client's interests. Presentation of false evidence, whether perjured testimony, manufactured documents, or the like, stands in much the same position as
false pleading. Their use can only impede the goal of accuracy and, if
they are necessary to determination of the case, suggest that the
party offering them has no lawful claim or defense for adjudication.
Dilatory strategies likewise neither ensure a party the opportunity to
have a colorable claim adjudged nor contribute to accuracy. If anything, they tend systematically to undermine these goals, since the
72. E.g., H. Drinker, supra note 60, which devotes chapter V to The Lawyer's Obligation
to The Courts and chapter VI to The Lawyer's Obligationsto His Client.
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hope usually is that the other party will abandon his position from
lack of wealth or stamina. Certainly neither party will draw from
needless delay the conclusion that the legal system is fair and open.
And, like false pleading, dilatory tactics seriously impede the values
of expedience and convenience in the resolution of legal disputes.
These limits to a client's efforts to promote his own interests and
hence on the scope of the lawyer's agency are, therefore, best viewed
as an integral part of the adversary system, as the present Code of
Professional Responsibility recognizes, rather than as extraneous to
it.
DIFFERENTIAL NORMS WITHIN THE LAWYER'S ROLE
The discussion thus far has sought to show that rules governing
conduct of lawyers are rationally related and perhaps necessary to
achieving values of the legal system in which they function. In most
cases, the goals of the civil and criminal justice processes are similar
and, accordingly, they employ a common set of rules for professional
behavior. If, as the foregoing analysis suggests, conduct of lawyers is
closely defined by specific legal values, it should further be true that
where values differ between civil and criminal processes, behavioral
norms may also differ. Thus, the lawyer's role comprises not only
distinctively professional (rather than community) rules, but rules
particularly addressed to the nature of the proceeding in which he
appears.
Suppose, for example, that D, somewhat unimaginatively, punches
P in the nose. P initially seeks redress from D's pocketbook by instituting a civil action for battery. D consults lawyer A, admits that he
punched P, and that he did it for the fun of it. Despite questioning
by A, D offers no facts that would amount to a lawful excuse for his
behavior. D, however, would like to deny the complaint to see if P
can prove his case; it might, after all, end up "His word against
mine." Under these circumstances, lawyer A advises D that he cannot
file an answer denying true facts and will not do so. However
strongly D may feel about avoiding liability, he is required to plead
accurately, and counsel is bound by his signature on the pleadings to
vouch for a good faith belief in the facts there asserted. The case is
not, however, over. P may feel so aggrieved that he files a complaint
with the police which leads to a criminal prosecution against D for
the crime of battery. D consults lawyer B, admits all the facts, but
again says that he wishes to deny the charges and see what will
happen. Lawyer B agrees to that step.
Both lawyers, it should immediately be said, acted properly, al-
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though their conduct differed. Each followed the general injunction
to advance the lawful objectives of his client, although A refused to
enter a denial and B agreed to do so. If the analysis presented earlier
is useful, then, the differential norms for behavior must be explained
in terms of differential values or goals in tort and criminal cases,
which differences, in turn, define what a client may take as a "lawful
objective."
In civil proceedings, such as the tort case brought by P, it is
systematically assumed that the parties' interests in the result are
and that they are approximately equal in economic reequal7
74
Govsources, investigatory capability, and access to legal services.
a
civilized
providing
to
is
limited
ordinarily
participation
ernmental
forum in which the dispute can be resolved; it seeks nothing in the
result beyond peaceableness. In a contest between persons with equal
power and equal interest in the outcome, considerations extrinsic to
fair and accurate determinations of fact and law are rarely salient and
no error other than that necessarily associated with use of human
judges and juries need be accepted. Accordingly, inaccurate pleading
is inconsistent with the primary values of the civil litigative process
and will not be allowed.
The same result might once have been appropriate in criminal
prosecutions as well. At early common law, trials for crime, like
those for tort, involved a contest between a private accuser (the
victim or other interested persons) and the accused, with the government (represented by the judge) neutral until judgment of conviction
In time, however, the private accuser was largely
was entered. 7
eliminated in favor of a government agency. 7 6 Use of a public prosecutor involves more than a simple substitution of parties. For one
thing, relative power becomes an issue when the state is actively
interested in the matter. The resulting imbalance in resources raises
deep concern that the state can, simply through power and wealth,
routinely overwhelm any of its citizens.
Relative strength alone, however, does not fully distinguish civil
from criminal proceedings. Although a private party whose property
73. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standardsof Proof 14 Vand. L.
Rev. 807, 817 (1961).
74. See Homburger, State Class Actions and The Federal Rule, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609,
641 (1971). Where parity is clearly lacking, efforts are made to redress the imbalance
through judicial supervision of litigation, providing legal services for indigents, and creating
special forms of proceeding, such as the class action. Id.
75. J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 134-35 (1969).
76. Id. at 135. Some reminders of the original accusatorial system are found in statutes
allowing individuals to prosecute certain cases on behalf of governmental interests as "private attorneys general."
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has been condemned, for example, has little power compared to the
government, suits of this kind are usually viewed as civil for all
relevant purposes. To the imbalance in strength must be joined the
special cost of criminal proceedings to the defendant-the taking of
his liberty so that the state may be protected. Thus, whereas presumed equality of resources and interests largely account for the
emphasis on minimizing all error in civil cases, inequality of power
and the special consequences of intervention for the accused account
for the belief that, in prosecutions for crime, legitimacy requires less
overall accuracy -specifically, that accuracy in convicting guilty persons must be sacrificed in order to maximize accuracy in acquitting
17
the innocent.
It has also become, for these same reasons, a tenet of our political
philosophy that any individual is entitled to claim a substantial distance from the State acting to deprive him of liberty. This distance is
reflected in the requirement that the state prove a defendant's guilt
not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but without his cooperation.
The principle that forbids compelling a man to assist in his own
conviction, which has been called "one of the fundamental decencies
in the relation we have developed between government and man, ' 78
frees the defendant from requirements of candor and cooperation of
the kind imposed on parties to civil actions and from the duty to
participate testimonially in the proceedings. 7 9 This political distance
between state and individual is also reflected in the plea-taking
process. The criminal defendant's plea is never taken on oath (al77. J. Stephen, A General View of The Criminal Law of England 242 (1863); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958): "There is always in litigation a margin of error,....
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to
him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of... persuading the factfinder
at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Reduction of the
margin of error where liberty is at stake was held an essential element of due process in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
78. E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 8 (1955). See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 637 (1896).
79. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966):
All [the policies of the privilege against self-incrimination] point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the government "to shoulder the entire load,".., to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice
demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the
evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel,
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
See also Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57 (1964); United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391
(1957).
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though some civil pleadings must be sworn); 8 o it signifies not that he
is innocent in fact, but only that he asserts his right to freedom until
guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, by lawful evidence,
and according to proper procedure.8
While pleading is a truthtelling device in civil actions, its principal function is to define the
defendant's posture vis-a-vis the state in prosecutions for crime.
Unlike the civil case, therefore, it is a lawful objective for the
criminal accused to put his opponent to its burden of proof. This
rule is not, of course, intended to promote the values of accuracy
and efficiency, which probably would better be served by eliminating
the privilege against self-incrimination, using the lower burden of
proof employed in civil cases, and requiring the pleadings to represent truth rather than posture.8 2 However, it is required by special
values occurring in the criminal justice system where the political
question of state-individual relationship is presented. The difference
in values between civil and criminal matters, in this instance, necessarily calls for different procedures in plea-taking and different rules
for the conduct of counsel.
CONCLUSION
There is a tendency to think of the lawyer's role either as an
aspect of his role as a member of the community, as Brandeis'
layman does, or as a disembodied set of ethical principles produced
by intuition on the one hand and self-interest on the other. Neither
of these views is accurate. Attorneys, when acting in their professional capacity, occupy a special social role comprised of recognized,
particularistic rules for behavior referrable to the values of the legal
system. It is important both that these rules are particularistic and
that they are socially recognized. The former indicates that legal
professional norms may differ from the universalistic norms of the
community; the latter that these differences are socially approved. It
will not, I hope, be thought arrogant to observe that these factors
-and not income, social status, or the like-are what distinguish the
role of lawyers from, for example, that of plumbers. While each
group may adopt for its own purposes a "Code of Ethics," the codes
do not have equal significance. Except perhaps for the privilege of
80. In the Federal Rules and States following them, verification has largely been replaced
by the attorney's certification under Rule 11. However, there remain instances in which
parties must verify by affidavit the accuracy of their pleadings, particularly in matrimonial
proceedings. E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-5 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 211
(Supp. 1974-75).
81. W. Stapleton & L. Teitelbaum, In Defense of Youth: A Study of the Role of Counsel
in American Juvenile Courts 115 (1972).
82. Cf F. Remington, D. Newman, E. Kimball, M. Melli & H. Goldstein, Criminal Justice
Administration 671-72 (1969).
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engaging in the occupation itself, plumbers are neither entitled nor
permitted to act in a manner different from the conduct universally
expected of members of the community. Lawyers, on the other
hand, are governed by rules finding explicit approval in statutory and
judicial authority which not only allow but require them to behave
differently from members of the community generally.
The behavioral norms of attorneys cannot be defined, then, simply
by reference to expectations generally held about the conduct of
members of the community. On the other hand, these professional
norms are not unrelated to social values; rather, the values which
explain the lawyer's role are not those of the community at large but
those distinctive values held by the legal system. It is largely as
professional participants in the extraordinary process of judicial
dispute resolution that the role of counsel has meaning and, in
general, the conduct expected of counsel is directly related to accomplishment of the legal system's goals. As we have already seen, people
are licensed to practice law because, it is thought, their assistance is
necessary to presentation of claims for legal determination, because
their skill and special training enhance the likelihood that accurate
results will be achieved through the adversary system, and, as well,
because convenience in dispute resolution will be facilitated by the
participation of expert advocates. However important a norm, such
as espousing only causes in which one believes, may be in the
community, its appropriateness within the role of counsel must be
judged according to the values of the legal system. As the earlier
discussion demonstrates, a lawyer's sympathy with his client's cause
is irrelevant for most of those purposes and, in some circumstances,
is fundamentally inconsistent with their accomplishment. Thus,
unlike the layman, an attorney acting in a professional capacity may
and often must dissociate advocacy from belief in the social merits of
a case. He rests instead on the social importance of allowing members
of the community to present their claims for legal resolution and of
facilitating the process by which accurate determination of those
claims is achieved.
It is doubtless true that, even understanding why the role of
lawyers differs from that of laymen and how that difference produces role strain, attorneys will still experience conflict of this sort.
It is also true that in certain respects the rules of professional responsibility deny to lawyers the mechanisms for avoiding stress mentioned at the beginning of this discussion. The propriety of abandoning a case is contradicted not only by the requirement of zealous
advocacy but by rules restricting such conduct when the client will
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be injured thereby.8 3 Avoidance of criminal cases has been vigorously condemned by the American Bar Association 8 4 as it was
almost 450 years ago by Scottish court rule. In other ways, however,
the Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes and contributes to
easing the strain upon lawyers. The fact that a formal and somewhat
comprehensive set of rules exists goes some distance towards
emphasizing the existence of a distinctive social role for attorneys
and the importance of following particular behavioral norms. Moreover, the Code commonly employs mandatory rules, particularly
where strain is most likely. In this way, counsel is insulated from
having to choose between community and professional norms and is
required to follow the latter. Finally, the rules place responsibility
for most fundamental decisions with the client, which also has the
effect of distancing counsel from determination of a course of action
and removing him from responsibility for it. To the extent the
reasons for these devices are appreciated, they are valuable to lawyers
faced with representing unattractive clients or causes; to the extent
they are not, the resulting conflict will continue as an uncomfortable
concomitant of the practice of law.

83. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-32; DR 2-110. The former states: "A
decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of compelling circumstances, and in a matter pending before a tribunal he must comply with the rules of the
tribunal regarding withdrawal." See also ABA Ethics and Grievances Committee, Opinions,
No. 314 (1965), holding that a lawyer should not disassociate himself from a cause when "it
is obvious that the very act of disassociation would [injure the client's interests]."
84. ABA, Standards Relating to the Defense Function § 1.5 (App. Dr. 1971).

